We find that the tone of management's qualitative disclosures in annual and quarterly financial reports reflects market sentiment. The correlation between the average management tone of financial reports and the investor sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) is 0.617, and investor sentiment explains 37.7% of the time-series variation in average management tone. As a result, management's qualitative disclosures are systematically biased: when managers are more optimistic as a group, future earnings and stock returns are lower (at both the firm level and the aggregate level). This bias reduces the usefulness of management's qualitative disclosures.
Introduction
Market commentators and regulators often discuss the importance of market sentiment in the economy (see, for e.g., Keynes (1936) ; Greenspan (1996) ; Shiller (2000) ).
1 Most of this discussion has focused on the effect of sentiment on the decisions of investors (see, for e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2006) , Baker and Wurgler (2007) , Tetlock (2007 ), Baker et al. (2012 , Cornelli et al. (2006) , and Han (2008) ). However, recent work by Hribar and McInnis (2012) demonstrates that sentiment is associated with predictable biases in analyst earnings forecasts, while Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) and Brown et al.
(2012) link sentiment to managers' earnings forecasts and pro-forma earnings disclosures.
These findings suggest that sentiment is a pervasive factor in financial markets, influencing managers and financial analysts in addition to investors.
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature by examining whether sentiment influences managers' qualitative disclosures. We find that when investor sentiment is high (low), managers as a group become more optimistic (pessimistic) in their qualitative disclosures. As a result, management's qualitative disclosures are systematically biased:
when managers are more optimistic (pessimistic) as a group, future earnings and stock returns are lower (higher), at both the firm level and the aggregate level. This bias reduces the usefulness of qualitative disclosures.
We focus on qualitative disclosures for several reasons. Qualitative disclosures account for most of the information available in the marketplace (Gangolly and Wu (2000) , Li (2010b)). The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) states that managers' forwardlooking statements are perhaps the most useful disclosures to investors (Securities Act
Release No. 5362). They provide context for financial statements and allow investors to see the company and its prospects "through the eyes of managers" (SEC, Release 1 We follow Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) and define market sentiment broadly as "a belief about future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts at hand." In this paper, we prefer the term "market sentiment" or "market-wide sentiment" instead of "investor sentiment" to emphasize that sentiment can influence analysts, managers, and other market participants, in addition to investors.
Nos. . Unlike hard financial numbers that are mostly historical in nature and are the outcome of rigid accounting rules, qualitative disclosures reflect managers' projections, plans, opinions, beliefs, and intentions (Ripken, 2005) , making them more likely to reflect sentiment. Qualitative disclosures also provide a unique setting for measuring managerial optimism and pessimism. By looking at words managers use to describe the future, we can measure the linguistic tone (optimistic or pessimistic) of the disclosures. The validity of this approach has been confirmed by a series of recent papers in finance and accounting (e.g., Tetlock (2007) , Feldman et al. (2009 ), Li (2010a , and Loughran and McDonald (2011) ). Brown et al. (2012) discuss three distinct views for why sentiment may influence managers' financial disclosures -the informative, opportunistic, and managerial sentiment views. The informative and opportunistic views both presume that managers are not susceptible to sentiment. Instead, managers are able to identify periods of high and low sentiment and make disclosures to either correct (informative view) or perpetuate (opportunistic view) investors' misperceptions about their firms. This leads to an association between sentiment and managers' financial disclosures. Consistent with the informative view, Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) show that during low-sentiment periods managers increase forecasts to "walk-up" current estimates of future earnings. In contrast, managers opportunistically reduce their long-horizon forecasting activities during highsentiment periods. Similarly, Brown et al. (2012) show that managers opportunistically disclose "pro forma" (adjusted) earnings metrics in earnings press releases when sentiment is high.
Unlike the informative and opportunistic views, the managerial sentiment view presumes that professional managers are just as susceptible to market sentiment as investors are. This view is premised on much empirical work showing that managers have no special skills in forecasting aggregate factors. For example, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) show that stock returns tend to be low when managers' expectations of returns are high. Hutton et al. (2012) show that managers' forecasts with respect to aggregate information are less accurate than the forecasts of financial analysts. Butler et al. (2006 Butler et al. ( , 2011 show that managers are unable to time equity issues to benefit from market upturns and downturns. Similarly, Anilowski et al. (2007) show that, at the aggregate level, management's earnings guidance is not a useful predictor of earnings and does not affect stock prices.
At the same time, managers are susceptible to many of the behavioral biases afflicting investors, including overconfidence and attribution bias (e.g., Malmendier and Tate (2005) , Malmendier and Tate (2008) , Ben-David et al. (2013) , Libby and Rennekamp (2012) , Hribar and Yang (2013) ), loss-aversion (e.g., Statman and Sepe (1989) , Shefrin (2001) ), disposition effect (e.g., Crane and Hartzell (2008) ), and anchoring (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2011) ). Hence, like investors, professional managers may become overly optimistic (pessimistic) when market-wide sentiment is high (low).
We measure the optimism of managers' forward-looking qualitative disclosures in the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section of 10-K and 10-Q reports. In addition to explaining current and past operations, the SEC requires that the MD&A section includes managers' assessment of future prospects. Such forward-looking MD&A statements reflect management's plans for future operations, predictions of future economic performance, and other views and opinions. 2 According to the SEC, the principal objectives of the MD&A section are: "(1) to provide a narrative explanation of a company's financial statements that enables investors to see the company through the eyes of management; (2) to enhance the overall financial disclosure and provide the context within which financial information should be analyzed; and (3) to provide information about the quality of, and potential variability of, a company's earnings and cash flow, so that investors can ascertain the likelihood that past performance is indicative of future performance" . In order to promote the release of forward-looking statements by managers, Congress in 1995 passed the Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements (the "Safe Harbor") as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) ).
To test whether management tone is associated with sentiment, we calculate the average management tone (AvgTone) across all 10-K and 10-Q reports in a given month.
AvgTone measures how optimistic managers are as a group at a particular point in time.
We then relate the time-series of AvgTone to the investor sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) . The investor sentiment index is calculated using the first principal component of six market-based measures: the value-weighted closed-end fund discount, NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day IPO returns, dividend premium, and equity share issuances. The rationale behind the investor sentiment index is that while market-wide sentiment is not directly observable, it can be inferred from its effect on observable market outcomes. If management tone is influenced by market-wide sentiment, then we expect AvgTone to be significantly associated with investor sentiment in the time-series.
Our results show that managers tend to be more optimistic as a group when investor sentiment is high. Using monthly data from 2000 to 2010, we find that AvgTone and investor sentiment are correlated at 0.617. One standard deviation increase in investor sentiment is associated with a 10% increase in AvgTone relative to its mean value. Investor sentiment explains 37.7% of the time-series variation in AvgTone. The positive association between AvgTone and investor sentiment remains strong after we control for economic fundamentals. These findings suggest that market-wide sentiment has a large effect on managers' qualitative disclosures. Using Granger-causality tests, we find that management tone and investor sentiment move contemporaneously with each other (i.e., neither variable Granger-causes the other). This finding is consistent with the idea that both variables reflect the same underlying construct (i.e., market-wide sentiment).
Sentiment is often thought to stem from market participants' overreaction to current conditions (e.g., Baker et al. (2012) ). As a result, market sentiment tends to be high (low) at market peaks (troughs) (see, for e.g., Shiller (2000) and Akerlof and Shiller (2009) ).
This leads to a negative association between market sentiment and future realizations of earnings and returns. Because management tone on average is more optimistic when sentiment is high, the usefulness of manager's qualitative disclosures is likely to be reduced. Consistent with this prediction, we find that when managers are more optimistic as a group (as measured by high AvgTone), future earnings are low after controlling for fundamentals. This finding contrasts with the positive association between firm-specific (idiosyncratic) management tone and subsequent firm-level earnings (see Li (2010a) ). Including investor sentiment as an additional explanatory variable reduces but does not eliminate the negative association between AvgTone and future earnings. These results show the existence of a common bias in MD&A reports that is related to market sentiment: managers' qualitative disclosures become overly optimistic and overly pessimistic over the market cycle. In addition, we find that AvgTone is negatively associated with subsequent firm-level stock returns, i.e., managers are optimistic (pessimistic) when stock prices are above (below) fundamental values. Similarly, managers become overly optimistic and pessimistic alongside analysts, as evidenced by a positive association between AvgTone and signed analyst forecast errors. These results confirm that market-wide sentiment influences investors, analysts, and managers.
To differentiate between the opportunistic and managerial sentiment views for why the tone of qualitative disclosures is positively related to sentiment, we examine earnings and stock returns following periods of managerial optimism and pessimism. According to the opportunistic view, when sentiment is high, managers make overly optimistic disclosures to perpetuate investors' optimism so as to maintain the overvaluation of their firms' equity (Jensen (2005) ). However, when sentiment is low, managers have no incentive to make overly pessimistic disclosures and drive equity prices even further below fundamental value. Hence, according to the opportunistic view, the negative relation between average management tone and future earnings and stock returns should be driven by periods of managerial optimism and should not be evident following periods of managerial pessimism. In contrast, according to the managerial sentiment view, managers are themselves susceptible to market sentiment and make overly optimistic (pessimistic) disclosures as market-wide sentiment increases (decreases). This view predicts a symmetric effect: lower than usual earnings and stock returns following periods of managerial optimism, and higher than usual earnings and stock returns following periods of managerial pessimism.
We identify months when managers as a group are optimistic (pessimistic) as those months in the top (bottom) 25% of the time-series distribution of average management tone (AvgT one). Consistent with the managerial sentiment view, we find that the results are symmetric. Specifically, earnings and stock returns are lower following months when managers are optimistic, and are higher following months when managers are pessimistic.
These findings suggests that managers themselves are susceptible to sentiment.
We conduct several additional tests to ensure that our results are robust to alternative research designs. First, we show that the negative association between AvgTone and subsequent earnings and stock returns is also observable at the aggregate level. AvgTone is negatively associated with aggregate earnings and aggregate stock returns calculated using data on Standard and Poor's S&P 500 index. Second, we show that the results are similar when we measure AvgTone using all statements (both backward-and forwardlooking) in the MD&A section of financial reports. Finally, our results are not sensitive to using different weighting schemes for calculating management tone.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to show that managers' qualitative disclosures reflect market sentiment. This finding is important given that qualitative disclosures account for the majority of information available in the market. If managers are themselves biased, their qualitative disclosures are unlikely to be useful to investors during periods of excessive optimism or pessimism. The finding that professional managers are susceptible to sentiment also implies that identifying periods of high or low sentiment in real time is likely to present significant challenges even for sophisticated market participants.
This may partly explain why sentiment effects are not easily arbitraged away in capital markets.
Our paper builds on nascent research that uses textual analysis to study the information content of managers' qualitative disclosures. The current consensus in the literature is that such qualitative disclosures are informative to investors. For example , Feldman et al. (2009 ), Li (2010a ), and Loughran and McDonald (2011 document that, at the firm level, the textual tone (i.e., optimistic vs. pessimistic) of MD&A reports is positively associated with filing period stock returns and subsequent earnings. Muslu et al. (2014) find that forward-looking sentences in MD&A reports improve the information efficiency of stock prices with respect to accounting earnings. Bochkay and Levine (2014) show that MD&A disclosures increase the accuracy of future earnings forecasts and become more informative following recent regulatory reforms of 2001 -2003 . In contrast, Huang et al. (2013 find that managers strategically manipulate disclosure tone to bias investor perceptions or achieve other managerial objectives. In this paper, we identify a common bias in qualitative disclosures that reduces their usefulness. We find that while firm-level management tone is positively related to subsequent firm-level performance, the average management tone is negatively related to subsequent earnings, stock returns, and positively related to analyst forecast errors. Investors interested in understanding a firm's prospects would be better served by focusing on the idiosyncratic information in MD&As and, to the extent possible, ignoring any common optimism or pessimism across firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe how we measure the tone of the MD&A section in quarterly and annual reports, and describe the data used in the study. In Section 3, we examine the association between management tone and investor sentiment. In Section 4, we relate average management tone to firm-level future earnings, stock returns, and analyst forecast errors. In Section 5, we report the results of a series of robustness tests, including tests at the aggregate level. We briefly summarize our findings in Section 6.
Data and Methodology

Quarterly and Annual SEC reports
We use the linguistic tone of forward-looking MD&A disclosures in 10-K and 10-Q reports to measure the level of managerial optimism. We download all 10-K and 10-Q filings between 2000 and 2012 from EDGAR using the SEC indices of all filings submitted to the commission. Following Muslu et al. (2014), we consider forward-looking sentences as those that contain any of the following phrases or references:
1. Keywords that are commonly used to refer to the future: "will", "future", "next fiscal/ month/ period/ quarter/ year", "incoming fiscal/ month/ period/ quarter/ year", "coming fiscal/ month/ period/ quarter/ year", "upcoming fiscal/ month/ period/ quarter/ year", "subsequent fiscal/ month/ period/ quarter/ year", "following fiscal/ month/ period/ quarter/ year".
Example: "We will continue to invest in several areas of technology and content, [...] to enhance the customer experience and improve our process efficiencies" (Amazon.com, 10-Q, second quarter of 2007).
2. Verb conjugations that relate to the future: "aim", "anticipate", "assume", "commit", "estimate", "expect", "forecast", "foresee", "hope", "intend", "plan", "project", "seek", and "target".
Example: "Dell currently expects that this gross margin environment will continue to be challenging, but Dell's intent is to focus on improving gross margins and operating margins as the economy improves." (Dell Computer Corp., 10-K, fiscal year 2002).
3. References to future years relative to the year of filing. We use the bag of words approach (BOW) to represent the forward-looking MD&A texts numerically. BOW identifies a word and counts the number of times it appears in a document. Each document is represented by the words it contains, with ordering and punctuation ignored. To calculate the tone of forward-looking statements in MD&As, we count the occurrences of positive and negative words from the L&M dictionary.
Many studies in the automatic text retrieval literature show that weighting word counts properly (often referred to as term weighting) can enhance the effectiveness of an information retrieval system (Salton and Buckley (1988); Buckley (1993) ; Jurafsky and James (2000)). Term weighting improves simple word counts by combining three factors that affect the importance of a word in text:
1. Term Frequency (tf )-measures the number of times a term occurs within a document;
2. Inverse Document Frequency (idf ) -downgrades frequently occurring words in a sample of documents, assuming that words that are used in many documents are less informative;
3. Word Count (wc) -serves as a normalization for document length.
Following Loughran and McDonald (2011), we apply one of the most popular termweighting rules that accounts for common words within a sample of documents. The goal is to downgrade positive and negative words that occur in many documents and may be irrelevant to measuring managers' optimism. We use tf i,j to denote the number of times a word i appears in a document j, wc j to denote the average word count in the document j, N to denote the number of MD&A documents in the sample, and df i to denote the number of MD&A documents that contain at least one occurrence of word i.
Then, the weighted measure of the i th word occurrence in the j th document is defined as:
The first term measures the normalized word frequency (i.e., normalized tf ), while the second term downgrades common words in the sample (i.e., inverse document frequency, idf ). If P and N represent sets of positive and negative words in the j th document, respectively, then, using (1), we define the tone of document j as the difference between positive and negative scores:
For each firm-quarter observation, we decompose management tone (MgmtTone) into two components: the common tone across all firms filing financial reports in a particular month (AvgTone) and an idiosyncratic, firm-specific tone in a particular month (IdioTone). AvgTone is calculated as the simple average of all firm-level tone scores of forward-looking statements in MD&A sections of 10-K and 10-Q reports filed in a given month. 7 It measures how optimistic managers are as a group at a particular point in time.
IdioTone is defined as the difference between MgmtTone and AvgTone. IdioTone captures idiosyncratic (firm-specific) factors relevant to individual firms' MD&A disclosures.
All other variables are from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and IBES. Table 1 outlines data sources and variable definitions in detail.
[ Table 1 about here.] Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analyses. The mean (median) of MgmtTone is -0.118 (-0.071). This corresponds to positive and negative measures (using Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) [ Table 2 We require at least 12 quarterly observations per firm during the sample period, resulting in a sample of 4,280 unique firms. We find that the tone of individual MD&A reports varies with AvgTone. For the average firm, AvgTone accounts for 14.1% of the time-series variation in MgmtTone. The results vary in the cross section of firms; for 25% of the firms,
AvgTone explains more than 20% of the time-series variation in firm-level management tone. We find similar results when we split the sample into small, medium, and large firms, so it is not the case that only certain firms' disclosure tone varies with the common component of management tone. Overall, the results show that AvgTone is a significant component of individual MD&A reports. As a result, any bias in AvgTone could have a material effect on the usefulness of MD&A reports.
[ The results are reported in Table 4 . Panel A of Table 4 Panel B of Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients for a time-series regression of
AvgTone on InvestSent and several commonly used economic indicators (see, for e.g., Chen (1991) , Liew and Vassalou (2000) , Konchitchki and Patatoukas (2014) ). For comparison, we estimate two time-series regression models:
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the NeweyWest kernel with three lags. 8 In Eq. (4), A t is a vector of economic indicators, including aggregate change in earnings to sales relative to the same quarter last year (EarnSurp), risk premium (TermSpread and DefaultSpread ), growth in GDP over the prior year (GDPGrowth), and producer price index (LogPPI ). EarnSurp measures cash flow news and is also negatively associated with aggregate discount rate news (Patatoukas (2013)). TermSpread (the difference between rates on the 10-year Treasury notes and the 3-month Treasury notes) captures the risk of unexpected changes in interest rates (Fama and French (1993) ). Since the rate on the 3-month Treasury note captures the expected return on bonds, any premium for 10-year Treasury bonds can be thought of as compensation for future potential changes in expected returns. DefaultSpread (the difference in the yield of long-term BAA corporate bonds and long-term AAA corporate bonds) captures default risk. LogPPI measures the selling prices received by producers for their output. We expect managers to be more optimistic as a group when current business conditions are more favorable, as measured by a more positive aggregate earnings surprise, higher growth in GDP, and higher producer prices. Managers are also more likely to be optimistic when perceived risk is lower, as measured by a lower risk premium. The results remain unchanged after adding current economic conditions as explanatory variables for AvgTone in Eq. (4). We find that AvgTone is negatively associated with
TermSpread and positively associated with LogPPI ; managers are more optimistic as a group when the risk premium is low and when pricing is strong. There is weak evidence that managers are more optimistic when recent GDP growth has been high (the coefficient on GDP Growth is positive but insignificant). The R 2 for Eq. (4) increases to 48.1% from 37.7% for Eq. (3), consistent with the idea that AvgTone is affected by both fundamental factors and market sentiment. Still, investor sentiment appears to be the most relevant variable in explaining AvgTone. The results indicate that the tone of management's qualitative disclosures is positively associated with investor sentiment, either because managers are opportunistic in their disclosures, or because they too are susceptible to market-wide sentiment.
Panel C of Table 4 reports the results of Granger-causality tests between AvgTone and InvestSent. We choose a specification using two lags of each variable based on the Akaike information criterion. This analysis sheds light on the lead-lag relation between AvgTone and InvestSent. We find that the Granger-causality tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of no Granger-causality between management tone and investor sentiment. The two lags of InvestSent are jointly insignificant as determinants of AvgTone (p-value of 0.15).
Similarly, the two lags of AvgTone are jointly insignificant as determinants of InvestSent (p-value of 0.34). These results suggest that both managers and investors are simultaneously responding to market-wide sentiment, leading to a positive contemporaneous association between AvgTone and InvestSent.
[ Table 4 
Management Tone and Future Firm-Level Earnings
Given that investor sentiment is not justified by fundamentals, the positive association between management tone and investor sentiment at the very least makes management's qualitative disclosures noisy. Of greater concern is the finding, dating back at least to Keynes (1936) , that market-wide sentiment is strongly pro-cyclical: it is highest (lowest)
at market peaks (troughs). If market-wide sentiment is pro-cyclical, and if AvgTone moves with market-wide sentiment, then high (low) AvgTone is likely to be followed by 
In Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), q indexes fiscal quarters and k varies from one to four.
M gmtT one q is measured using the financial report (10-K or 10-Q) for quarter q. AvgT one q is measured as the average M gmtT one q of all firms filing either a 10-K or a 10-Q report during the filing month for quarter q. Earnings q+k is defined as net income for quarter q + k divided by book value of total assets for quarter q. M q is a vector of firm-specific controls measured as of quarter q, including Earnings, QtrReturn, Accruals, Size, MTB, EarnVol, RetVol, SI, FirmAge, and DLW. Li (2010a) motivates the use of these controls, and shows that they are significantly associated with both firm-level management tone and with subsequent earnings. Equations (5) and (6) Results are reported in These magnitudes are economically meaningful considering the mean value of Earnings is 0.005. For example, for a firm with total assets of $10 billion, the coefficients translate into a drop in earnings of $8 million in quarter q +1 ($10 billion × 0.0008) and $32 million in quarter q + 4 ($10 billion × 0.0032). These results show that AvgTone contains a large pro-cyclical bias.
10
Does market sentiment account for these findings? If AvgTone is negatively associated with future earnings because of market-wide sentiment, then including another proxy for market sentiment (i.e., InvestSent) should reduce the negative association between
AvgTone and future earnings. The results for the third set of regression models in Table 5 support this argument. Including InvestSent as an additional control in Eq. (6) reduces the coefficient on AvgTone across all four quarters. The number of observations in these specifications is lower because investor sentiment data are not available after 2010. For horizons of one to two quarters, the coefficient on AvgTone is reduced by more than 50%. For horizons of three to four quarters, the coefficient on AvgTone is reduced by one third. Hence, the negative association between AvgTone and future earnings is driven in part by the strong positive association between AvgTone and InvestSent. We find that the coefficient on InvestSent is also consistently negative; when investor sentiment is high, future earnings are low. Nevertheless, AvgTone is negatively associated with future earnings even after InvestSent is included in the regressions. This suggests that AvgTone and InvestSent capture similar but not identical aspects of market-wide sentiment.
The common bias in management's qualitative disclosures reduces their usefulness to investors. This can be easily seen by comparing the coefficients on MgmtTone and
IdioTone in show it is the firm-specific, idiosyncratic component of management tone that contains meaningful information for understanding a firm's prospects. In contrast, the common component of management tone relates primarily to market-wide sentiment. Hence, investors interested in understanding a firm's prospects would be better served by focusing on the idiosyncratic information in MD&A reports and, to the extent possible, ignoring any common optimism or pessimism across firms.
[ 
11
Similar to the results in Table 5 , we find that including InvestSent as an additional explanatory variable for subsequent returns does not eliminate the negative association between AvgTone and future stock returns. The magnitude of the coefficient on AvgTone is reduced by approximately one fourth, from 4.223 to 3.254.
[ Table 6 about here.] between InvestSent and analyst forecast errors; analyst forecasts tend to be overly optimistic (pessimistic) when sentiment is high (low). Similarly, Hribar and McInnis (2012) show that when sentiment is high, analysts' earnings forecasts are relatively more optimistic for high uncertainty firms. If analysts' forecasts are systematically biased, they are unlikely to counteract the bias in management's disclosures. In this section, we examine whether the bias in management's qualitative disclosures is evident in analysts' earnings forecasts. If managers become biased alongside analysts, then analysts' forecasts would be overly optimistic (pessimistic) when management's qualitative disclosures are overly optimistic (pessimistic). This leads to more positive ex-post analyst forecast errors (i.e., forecasted earnings exceed reported earnings by a greater amount) following periods of 11 It could be that managers' disclosures influence equity prices directly, driving prices away from fundamental values. We explore this possibility by relating stock returns during the short-window around the filing of 10-Q and 10-K reports to AvgTone. We do not find any reliable evidence that equity prices increase with AvgTone. One limitation of this analysis is that AvgTone tends to be persistent, so it is difficult to identify the precise timing of the effect of AvgTone on equity prices.
Management Tone and Analyst Forecast Errors
greater managerial optimism as measured by high AvgTone.
To test this prediction, we estimate variants of Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) with analyst forecast error (FE) as the dependent variable. FE is calculated as the difference between forecasted annual earnings per share (EPS) and actual annual EPS divided by price. We measure EPS forecasts and stock prices for the month following the 10-K/10-Q filing month to ensure that analysts have access to the latest financial information, including the latest MD&A report used to calculate management tone. A positive (negative) analyst forecast error corresponds to an optimistic (pessimistic) earnings forecast.
Results are reported in Table 7 . We find that when the firm-level tone of the MD&A report is more optimistic, analyst forecasts tend to be more pessimistic ex-post. One standard deviation increase in MgmtTone decreases analyst forecast errors by 0.0016 (0.16% of price). This decrease is large relative to the mean analyst forecast error of 0.012 (1.2% of price). When we decompose MgmtTone into IdioTone and AvgTone, we find that the negative relation between MgmtTone and FE is driven by IdioTone. Analysts apparently do not fully adjust their forecasts in response to the idiosyncratic tone of the MD&A report. As shown in Table 5 , when the idiosyncratic tone of the MD&A report is more optimistic, future earnings are higher. When analysts (partly) ignore this positive signal, their forecasts fall short of realized earnings, leading to a negative association between FE and IdioTone. To the best of our knowledge, this result has not been previously reported in the literature.
In contrast to MgmtTone and IdioTone, AvgTone is significantly positively associated with analyst forecast errors. When managers become optimistic in the MD&A reports as a group, analyst forecasts are also more optimistic. One standard deviation increase in AvgTone is associated with 0.005 increase in analyst forecast errors (significant at the 1% level), which corresponds to a 42% increase relative to the mean analyst forecast error of 0.012. Importantly, analysts' more optimistic forecasts are not warranted given the ex-post earnings realizations. Overall, the results suggest that managers and analysts are both susceptible to market-wide sentiment. Similar to our prior results for earnings and returns, including InvestSent in the specification reduces but does not subsume the effect of AvgTone on FE. The coefficient on InvestSent is positive but insignificant when AvgTone is also included in the regression.
When AvgTone is excluded, InvestSent is positive and highly significant (coefficient of 0.007, t-stat of 4.36).
12 This finding is consistent with that of Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) . We conclude that market sentiment is a pervasive factor in capital markets that influences managers, analysts, and investors alike.
[ Table 7 about here.]
Opportunistic vs. Managerial Sentiment View
The results reported thus far are consistent with both the opportunistic and the managerial sentiment views for why the tone of management's qualitative disclosures is related to market-wide sentiment. In this section, we present additional analysis to differentiate between these two alternative views.
According to the opportunistic view, managers recognize periods of high market-wide sentiment and make optimistic statements to perpetuate investors' optimism. This disclosure strategy helps maintain (or contributes to) an inflated stock price (Jensen (2005) ).
When market-wide sentiment is low, heightened investor skepticism prevents such opportunistic disclosures (Brown et al. (2012) ). Importantly, managers have no incentives to pessimistically bias their disclosures when sentiment is low, because this would further depress the stock price. As a result, management tone is optimistically biased at market peaks (when market-wide sentiment is high) but is unbiased at market troughs (when market-wide sentiment is low). Hence, the opportunistic view implies lower than usual earnings and stock returns following periods of managerial optimism but not higher than usual earnings and stock returns following periods of managerial pessimism.
12 These results are not tabulated and are available from the authors.
In contrast, according to the managerial sentiment view, professional managers themselves are susceptible to market-wide sentiment and become overly optimistic (pessimistic) in their disclosures as market-wide sentiment increases (decreases). As a result, management tone is overly optimistic at market peaks (when market-wide sentiment is high)
and overly pessimistic at market troughs (when market-wide sentiment is low) relative to future realizations of earnings and stock returns. Hence, the managerial sentiment view implies lower than usual earnings and stock returns following periods of managerial optimism, and higher than usual earnings and stock returns following periods of managerial pessimism. The predicted symmetry between periods of managerial optimism and pessimism differentiates the managerial sentiment view from the opportunistic view.
We identify months when managers as a group are either optimistic or pessimistic using the time-series distribution of average management tone (AvgTone). Specifically, we create two dummy variables, OptAvgTone and PesAvgTone, to indicate months when managers are either optimistic or pessimistic, respectively. OptAvgTone (PesAvgTone ) equals one if a given month is in the top (bottom) 25% of the time-series distribution of AvgTone, and zero otherwise. We then reestimate Eq. (6) for future earnings and stock returns by replacing the continuous variable AvgTone with the two dummy variables, OptAvgTone and PesAvgTone. The focus is on the coefficients on OptAvgTone and
PesAvgTone. The opportunistic view predicts a negative coefficient on OptAvgTone (indicating that managers become overly optimistic as a group) and an insignificant coefficient on PesAvgTone. In contrast, the managerial sentiment view predicts a negative coefficient on OptAvgTone and a positive coefficient on PesAvgTone, indicating that managers become overly optimistic (pessimistic) as sentiment increases (decreases).
Results are reports in Table 8 . Consistent with the managerial sentiment view, we find worse than usual performance following months when managers are optimistic, and better than usual performance following month when managers are pessimistic. The results hold for both future earnings and stock returns. For earnings, months when managers are optimistic are followed by 1.01% lower earnings to assets over the next four quarters (calculated as the sum of the four quarterly coefficients), while months when managers are pessimistic are followed by 1.1% higher earnings to assets. The interpretation is that managers become overly optimistic and overly pessimistic as a group relative to subsequent earnings realizations. For returns, months when managers are optimistic are followed by 13.7% lower annual returns, while months when managers are pessimistic are followed by 16.6% higher annual return. In other words, managers become overly optimistic and pessimistic alongside investors; they are overly optimistic when prices exceed fundamentals, and overly pessimistic when prices are below fundamentals. 13 Overall, the strong results for periods of managerial pessimism, and the symmetry between period of managerial optimism and pessimism provide compelling support for the view that managers themselves are susceptible to market-wide sentiment.
[ Our results show a strong negative association between AvgTone and subsequent firmlevel earnings and returns. In this section, we examine the relationship between AvgTone and subsequent aggregate earnings and aggregate returns. We examine the aggregate data for two reasons. First, this analysis helps alleviate concerns that the standard errors in our earlier tests are biased downward because of cross-sectional dependencies among firms filing reports in the same year-quarter. Second, we have argued that the bias in 13 Managers become overly optimistic and pessimistic alongside analysts as well. Months when managers are optimistic are followed by higher analyst forecast errors (i.e., analyst forecasts excess reported earnings by a greater amount), while months when managers are pessimistic are followed by lower analyst forecast errors. management tone is systematic because it is related to market sentiment. Hence, the bias should be evident in the aggregate series of earnings and returns that smooth out firm-level variations in these measures.
We estimate the following time-series regression model using a sample of 152 monthly observations over the period 2000-2012:
In Eq. (7) and Eq. (8), Performance t+12 is measured either as one-year-ahead aggregate earnings (Earnings t+12 ) or one-year-ahead S&P return (Return t+12 ). A t is a vector of economic indicators measured in month t, including EarnSurp, TermSpread, DefaultSpread, GDPGrowth, and LogPPI. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey-West kernel with three lags. Table 9 reports the regression results of estimating Eq. (7) and (8). Consistent with the firm-level results reported in Section 4, we find that AvgTone is significantly negatively associated with aggregate earnings and aggregate stock returns, even after controlling for traditional macroeconomic variables. One standard deviation increase in AvgTone is associated with a 0.0089 decrease in one-year-ahead aggregate earnings.
This effect is economically meaningful considering that the mean value of aggregate oneyear-ahead earnings is 0.05. One standard deviation increase in AvgTone is associated with an 8.7% decrease in one-year-ahead S&P return. InvestSent reduces but does not eliminate the negative association between AvgTone and future aggregate earnings and S&P returns. These findings show that the negative association between AvgTone and subsequent earnings and returns holds at the aggregate level.
[ Table 9 about here.]
Alternative Measures of Management Tone
The results reported thus far are based on the tone of forward-looking statements in the MD&A section of 10-K and 10-Q reports. However, a careful reading of a number of reports shows that much of the MD&A section concerns current or past performance. In additional tests, we examine whether our results are robust to calculating management tone using all MD&A sentences (both backward-and forward-looking). Backward-looking statements usually discuss past performance and significant events of a company (i.e., factual disclosures), whereas forward-looking statements are more subjective and reflect managers' expectations and beliefs. We find that sentiment influences the tone of the entire MD&A section, but has the largest impact on the forward-looking (subjective) statements. Calculating AvgTone using the entire MD&A section gives similar results to those reported in the paper. The average tone of backward-looking statements is also negatively associated with future earnings and returns, but the relationship is not as strong as for forward-looking statements (results are not tabulated, but are available from the authors upon request).
We also conduct several additional tests to ensure our results are robust to different weightings of management tone. First, we calculate AvgTone as the value-weighted average of firm-level tone measures, using market capitalization as a weight. All results are qualitatively the same. Second, we consider different term weighting schemes in calculating firm-level management tone (alternatives to Eq.(1) in Section 2.2). Specifically, we weight words using: (1) tf × log(idf ), where the term frequency (tf ) is normalized by the total words in a document; (2) tf × log(industry idf ), where the second term assigns lower (higher) weights to more (less) common words within documents of the same industry; (3) log(tf ) × log(industry idf ); (4) tf × log(company idf ), where the second term assigns lower (higher) weights to more (less) common words within documents of the same company, and (5) log(tf ) × log(company idf ). The results using these alternative weights remain qualitatively the same as those reported in the paper.
Conclusions
This study examines how the tone of forward-looking MD&A disclosures filed with the SEC varies with investor sentiment, and the effect of the resulting bias on the usefulness of MD&A disclosures. We measure the tone of a comprehensive set of MD&A reports from 2000 to 2012. We find a significant common component in the tone of individual MD&A reports. Importantly, we find that managers tend to become optimistic (pessimistic) as a group when investor sentiment is high (low). As a result, when managers are more optimistic (pessimistic) in their disclosures as a group, future earnings and stock returns are low (high), and analyst forecast errors are more negative (positive). Taken together, our results suggests that managers, much like investors and analysts, are susceptible to market-wide sentiment. Investors interested in understanding a firm's prospects would be better served by focusing on the idiosyncratic information in MD&A reports and, to the extent possible, ignoring any common optimism or pessimism across firms. COMPUSTAT ∆Earnings q+k Net Income in quarter q + k, k = 1..4, minus net income in quarter q divided by book value of total assets in quarter q, winsorized at 1% and 99%.
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Annual buy-and-hold stock return over the next year. CRSP FE Analyst forecast error, calculated as the difference between the forecasted annual EPS and actual annual EPS divided by price, winsorized at 1% and 99%.
IBES
Accruals
Earnings minus cash flows from operations divided by book value of assets, winsorized at 1% and 99%.
COMPUSTAT Size Natural logarithm of the market value of equity. COMPUSTAT
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